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REGARDING CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
RECENT CONTROVERSIES REGARDING CONGRES-
SIONAL DISTRICTS
BY ISIDOR LOEB
Section 22 of an Act to provide for the fifteenth and subse-
quent decennial censuses and to provide for apportionment of
representatives in Congress, approved June 18, 1929,1 estab-
lishes an automatic procedure for apportioning representatives
among the states in case the Congress fails to perform this duty
after each decennial census. It provides that within one week
after the beginning of the second regular session of each Con-
gress, held after the taking of each census, the President shall
transmit to Congress a statement showing the number of repre-
sentatives to which each state would be entitled under an appor-
tionment of the then existing number of representatives made
in each of three different ways. If such Congress fails to pass
an apportionment act, each state shall be entitled to the number
of representatives based upon the method used in the last pre-
ceding apportionment. This was intended to prevent the fail-
ure to reapportion representatives that occurred after the Cen-
sus of 1920. It also settled the serious problem of the increas-
ing size of the House by limiting it to the existing number unless
Congress increases it. This automatic plan was followed in
1931, after Congress failed to pass a reapportionment act.
The solution of these problems was soon followed by the ap-
pearance of a new aspect of an old evil. Under the Constitu-
tion, representatives are apportioned among the several states 2
but nothing is provided regarding the division of the states into
districts for the purpose of electing representatives. At first
the states were left free to determine this question under their
power to prescribe the manner of holding elections for represen-
tatives.3 In 1842, Congress exercised its power to "make or al-
ter such regulations ' 4 by providing that each state should be
divided into districts equal in number to the number of repre-
146 Stat. 26, 2 U. S. C. A. 2a.
2 Const. U. S. Amend. 14, Sec. 2.
3 Const. U. S. Art. 1, Sec. 4, clause 1.
4 Ibid.
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sentatives to which it was entitled and that no district should
elect more than one representative. 5 The Apportionment Act of
1911 provides in section 4, "that in case of an increase in the
number of Representatives in any State under this apportion-
ment such additional Representative or Representatives shall be
elected by the State at large and the other Representatives by
the districts now prescribed by law until such State shall be re-
districted in the manner provided by the laws thereof and in ac-
cordance with the rules enumerated in section three of this
Act."6
The Act of 1842 left the arrangement of the districts to the
states except that it required that they should be "composed of
contiguous territory. ' 7 Subsequent acts added to this provision
and the Apportionment Act of 1911, section 3, provides that dis-
tricts shall be "composed of a contiguous and compact territory,
and containing as nearly as practicable an equal number of in-
habitants."'8 This modification was undoubtedly intended to
check the evil of "gerrymandering" that had developed in many
states. Notwithstanding this specific mandate, state legisla-
tures for partisan purposes, have continued to establish districts
that reveal great inequalities in population and exhibit bizarre
geographical features that are far from conforming to the test
of "compact territory."
Congress may have the power to eliminate gerrymandering by
creating the congressional districts in each state and the House
of Representatives, under its power to judge the elections of its
members,9 could refuse to seat representatives from districts
that were improperly laid out, but neither action has been seri-
ously suggested.
Failure to secure equitable districting from state legislatures
has led to appeal to the courts. Congressional redistricting
acts have been held invalid in a number of states because of in-
equalities in the population of the districts. The most recent
case of this character arose in Illinois after the legislature, in
1931, passed an act dividing the State into twenty-seven dis-
5 5 Stat. 491.
6 37 Stat. 14, 2 U. S. C. A. 4.
75 Stat. 491.
8 37 Stat. 14, 2 U. S. C. A. 3.
9 Const. U. S. Art. 1, Sec. 5, Clause 1.
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tricts for the election of representatives under the Congressional
Apportionment Act of 1929. Certain taxpayers applied for an
injunction to restrain the Secretary of State and a county clerk
from expending public moneys in carrying out the provisions of
the legislative act on the ground that it was unconstitutional.
The circuit court granted the injunction and, upon appeal, its
decree was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court. 10
The court ruled against the contention that the Apportion-
ment Act of 1929 had repealed the Act of 1911 which contained
the requirement for districts "containing as nearly as practi-
cable an equal number of inhabitants." It held that as the state
redistricting act provided too great variation in population of
the districts it was invalid because of conflict with the Appor-
tionment Act of 1911. The redistricting act, also was held to be
in conflict with the state constitution.
As the number of representatives to which Illinois is entitled
under the Apportionment Act of 1929 is the same as under the
Act of 1911 the result of this decision is that members will be
elected as before, two at large and the remainder from the twen-
ty-five districts provided by previous Illinois legislation.
In three other states controversies have arisen under the Ap-
portionment Act of 1929 regarding the participation of the gov-
ernor in the redistricting of the state." In one of these, New
York, which gained two representatives, the result may not
prove serious as the former districts would continue and the two
additional members may be elected at large.
The situation, however, is quite different in Minnesota and
Missouri which lost one and three representatives respectively.
In these states it is possible that the controversy may result in
the non-existence of any valid districts so that all of the repre-
sentatives must be elected at large on a general ticket.
In Missouri, at least, other serious controversies may arise
regarding matters of purely state concern. Constitutional pro-
visions relating to the initiative and referendum require that pe-
titions for either shall be signed by a certain percent of the legal
10 Moran v. Bowley (Ill. 1932) 179 N. E. 526.
11 The redistricting acts of the states were compiled by William Tyler
Page, Clerk of the House of Representatives and published in 1931 by the
Government Printing Office in a pamphlet entitled: REGULATIONS OF THE
LEGISLATURES OF CERTAIN STATES PRESCRIBING CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS.
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voters in each of two-thirds of the Congressional districts.' 2
Hence it may prove impossible to submit any act of the next
General Assembly to the referendum or to initiate any legisla-
tive act or constitutional amendment. If the next legislature
passes a redistricting act it would become effective ninety days
after the adjournment of the session. This would make it pos-
sible to file initiative petitions unless the session was prolonged
but it would be doubtful whether any act could be suspended by
referendum pqtitions as these must be filed not more than ninety
days after the adjournment of the session.
Another difficulty would grow out of the primary election law
which provides that the state committee of each political party
shall consist of members elected by the congressional district
committees 13 which probably could not be validly constituted if
there were no districts. There are also some state boards, such
as the Missouri State Board of Agriculture, 14 the members of
which must be apportioned among the congressional districts.
A case involving a similar question to that at issue in these
three states arose in South Dakota in 1910. A redistricting act
was suspended under the referendum provision of the state con-
stitution. A candidate for Congress in one of the new districts
contended that as Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution of the
United States gave the "legislature" the power to prescribe the
manner of holding elections for representatives, the referendum
provision was not applicable to the redistricting act. The Su-
preme Court of South Dakota in the case of Sehrader v. Polley' 5
held that the word "legislature" meant the lawmaking power
and that the redistricting act would not be valid unless ratified
by the voters.
In the case of Davis v. Hildebrant ' the Supreme Court of
the United States, in 1916, sustained a decision of the Ohio Su-
preme Court holding invalid a redistricting act which had been
rejected by the voters under the referendum provision of the
state constitution. This case turned upon the clause in the Ap-
portionment Act of 1911 which provided that redistricting
'12 Const. Mo. Art. 4, Sec. 57.
23 R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 10282.
14 R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 12349.
15 Schrader v. Polley (1910) 26 S. D. 5, 127 N. W. 848.
16 241 U. S. 565.
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should be made in the state "in the manner provided by the laws
thereof"' and the Court did not consider the meaning of the
term "legislature" in Article 1, Section 4, of the Constitution.
Minnesota was the first of the three states in which the recent
controversy was taken into the courts. The legislature, in 1931,
had passed a bill dividing the state,into nine congressional dis-
tricts. This bill when presented to the governor had been
vetoed by him on the ground of inequalities. The house of rep-
resentatives when it received the governor's veto passed a reso-
lution ordering the bill to be filed with the secretary of state.
The latter treated it as a valid act and received the filing fee of a
candidate from one of the congressional districts created by it.
A petition for an injunction to restrain the secretary of state
from accepting filing fees for such districts on the ground that
the act was invalid was presented to the district court. The lat-
ter sustained a demurrer to the petition and an appeal was taken
to the Supreme Court which affirmed the decision of the district
court on October 9, 1931.18
The court disposed of the argument that the districts provided
are so arbitrary and unfair as to be in conflict with the Federal
law. It held that the Apportionment Act of 1929 had entirely
repealed the Apportionment Act of 1911 and that the provision
in the former requiring apportionment "by the method used in
the last preceding apportionment . . . related exclusively to
the arithmetical method of computation." As the requirement of
the Act of 1911 for "districts composed of a contiguous and
compact territory, and containing as nearly as practicable an
equal number of inhabitants" was no longer in effect the states
were free from any limitation by Federal law regarding the
manner of arranging the districts. As this is "a political and
discretionary power granted by the Federal Constitution" it is
not subject to control by state constitutional provisions and "is
beyond the reach of the judiciary."
The court then considered the fundamental issue of the veto
of the governor and the failure to pass the bill over his veto. It
held that in the absence of any regulation by Congress, the
power "to prescribe congressional districts rests exclusively and
17 N. 6 above.
Is State ex rel. Smiley v. Holm (Minn. 1931) 238 N. W. 494.
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solely in the language of Section 4, Article I, of the United
States Constitution"'19 and that the question depended upon the
meaning of the term "legislature" in that section. The inten-
tion of the framers of the Constitution is decisive of this ques-
tion. The court held that they did not regard the governor as a
part of the legislature and that in many other parts of the Con-
stitution, e. g. those relating to the election of United States
Senators,20 and the ratification of constitutional amendments, 2 '
they used the term legislature as exclusive of the governor and
the lawmaking power and that this construction had been ap-
proved by the United States Supreme Court.22
The court properly criticized the theory in Sehrader v. Pol-
ley 23 that the power of the state to prescribe the manner of
electing representatives was a reserved power subject to limita-
tion by the state constitution, but its statement, that the second
ground for that opinion, that the term "legislature" meant the
lawmaking power "seems to have been overruled by Hawke v.
Smith," appears to be erroneous.
The court also considered the case of Davis v. Hildebrant2 4
and held that as the Act of 1911 had been repealed and as the
Act of 1929 contained no provision that redistricting should be
made in the state "in the manner provided by the laws thereof,"
that opinion had no application to the pending case.
As it believed that the term "legislature" in Article I, Section 4
of the Constitution means the representative body and is not
synonymous with the lawmaking power and does not include the
governor the court sustained the decision of the district court
holding the redistricting act of 1931 valid. Two justices dis-
sented on the ground that redistricting by the state must be by
legislation in which the governor participates.
In New York, the legislature passed a concurrent resolution
dividing the state into 45 congressional districts. This was not
19 "The times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and
representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof."20 Art. 1, Sec. 3.
21 Art. 5.
22 Hawke v. Smith (1920) 253 U. S. 221, in which it was held that the
ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment by the Ohio Legislature was not
subject to the referendum provision of the state constitution.
23 N. 15 above.
24 N. 16 above.
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presented to the governor for his approval but was filed with the
secretary of state. An application for a mandamus directing
the secretary of state to certify in election notices that repre-
sentatives are to be elected in the new districts was denied at a
Special Term of the Supreme Court. This decision was affirmed
by the Appellate Division and, upon appeal to the Court of Ap-
peals, was unanimously affirmed by that body on February 9,
1932.25
The court construed the term "legislature" in Article I, Section
4 of the Constitution, to mean the lawmaking power which in-
cludes the governor. It held that uniform practice in all of the
states in the matter of redistricting, while not conclusive, was
satisfactory evidence that the power is rightfully exercised. It
drew a distinction between the functions of a legislature in
choosing senators, ratifying constitutional amendments, etc.,
and "the prescribing or enacting of a rule or direction, which
must be followed and obeyed by the people of the state, called
the lawmaking power-such, for instance, as dividing the state
into congressional districts and directing the people where, when
and how to vote." As the governor did not participate in the re-
districting provided in the resolution it was not an act of the
legislature as a lawmaking body and is null and void.
The court also expressed the opinion that the Apportionment
Act of 1929 was not intended to repeal the Act of 1911. "The
two should be read together, if possible. One provided for the
method of election and the other merely for the number of rep-
resentatives." Hence the two additional representatives allot-
ted to New York under the provisions of the Act of 1929 may be
elected at large and the others from the old districts as provided
by section 4 of the 1911 Act.26
In Missouri the legislature passed a bill dividing the state into
13 congressional districts. This was submitted to the governor
and returned with his disapproval. A proceeding by mandamus
to compel the secretary of state to receive and file a declaration
of candidacy for nomination as representative from one of the
districts provided by this bill was quashed by a unanimous vote
of the Supreme Court on January 4, 1932.27
' Koenig v. Flynn (N. Y. 1932) 179 N. E. 705.
.6 See ante p. 212 for the provisions of this section.
• State ex rel. Carroll v. Becker (Mo. 1932) 45 S. W. (2d) 533.
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The court holds that the power to prescribe the manner of
holding elections for representatives that is given to the legis-
lature by Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution can be exer-
cised only in the enactment of a law. The court agrees with the
South Dakota and New York courts that the term "legislature"
in Article i, Section 4 of the Constitution means the lawmaking
body. It holds that the power to prescribe the manner of hold-
ing elections for representatives can be exercised only in the en-
actment of a law in which the governor participates. Some of
the things falling within its scope, such as, qualifications of
judges and form of ballots can be provided only by establishing
a rule. While these may be different from the forming of dis-
tricts, "the 'manner of holding elections' includes everything that
comes within the meaning of those words. . . The word
'Legislature' cannot mean one thing for one of such duties and
another thing for the rest." The bill passed by the two houses
is not a legislative act as it was vetoed by the governor.
The court disagreed with the Minnesota Court not only in the
meaning of the word "legislature" but also as regards the Ap-
portionment Act of 1911 which it held was not repealed by the
Act of 1929. It calls attention to the fact that the latter, in sec-
tion 21, expressly repeals certain acts "and all other laws or
parts of laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act." As
the Act of 1911 was not expressly repealed and as sections 3 and
4 of that act are not inconsistent with the Act of 1929 it follows
that they are still in effect. "Since the number of representa-
tives for Missouri has been reduced the former districts no long-
er exist and representatives must be elected at large."
The Minnesota, Missouri and New York cases have been taken
to the Supreme Court of the United States for review. That
Court heard arguments on the Minnesota cases early in March
and the two other cases were argued during the last of that
month. As the decision will affect the filing of declarations of
candidacy for representatives it is probable that it will be hand-
ed down in the near future.
It appears clear that the decision will turn on the meaning of
the word "legislature" in Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution.
It seems equally probable that the Court will sustain the well
reasoned opinions of the Missouri Supreme Court and the New
York Court of Appeals and will reverse the decision of the Min-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol17/iss3/2
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nesota Supreme Court. The following statement in the opinion
of the Court in Hawke v. Smith2 8 would seem to lead to such
result:
Article I, section 4, plainly gives authority to the state to
legislate within the limitations therein named. Such leg-
islative action is entirely different from the requirement of
the Constitution as to the expression of assent or dissent to
a proposed amendment to the Constitution. In such ex-
pression no legislative action is authorized or required.
If the Supreme Court announces a decision of this kind in a
short time it will be possible for the governor in each of the
three states to call a special session of the legislature to enact a
redistricting bill which would be effective in the elections of this
year. The situation in New York is not so serious as to justify
the resulting expense to the state. In Minnesota and Missouri,
however, it would appear highly desirable to avoid the election
at large of all representatives to say nothing of the other com-
plications that will exist as a result of a failure to provide con-
gressional districts.
If, on the other hand, the Supreme Court sustains the Minne-
sota decision, it would seem, the legislature, as a representative
body, would be authorized to pass all laws affecting the times,
places and manner of holding elections for United States Sen-
ators and Representatives without any participation on the part
of the governor but subject to such modification as Congress
might make. This of course would not apply to laws affecting
state elections and, as these are usually held at the same time
and place, the practical effect, probably, would be limited to con-
gressional redistricting acts.
Addenda
Proof was being read on this article when the United States
Supreme Court handed down its decisions in the above cases on
April 11. The Court was unanimous (Mr. Justice Cardozo not
participating) in reversing the decision of the Minnesota Su-
preme Court 29 and affirming the decisions in the Missouri 3° and
New York ' cases. The opinion of the Court is given in the
: N. 22 above, 231.
: Smiley v. Holm (1932) 52 S. Ct. 397.
Koenig v. Flynn (1932) 52 S. Ct. 403.
31 Carroll v. Becker (1932) 52 S. Ct. 402.
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Minnesota case, the decisions in the other cases being sustained
on the grounds stated in that opinion.
The opinion of the Court follows those of the Missouri Su-
preme Court and the New York Court of Appeals. It holds that
the term "legislature" in Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution
refers not to the "body" but to the function to be performed and
that the latter is that of lawmaking. Long and continuous prac-
tice in the states supports this interpretation. Referring to the
case of Davis v. Hildebrant,32 the Court said:
It is manifest that the Congress has no power to alter
article I, section 4, and that the Act of 1911, in its reference
to State laws, could but operate as a legislative recognition
of the nature of the authority deemed to have been confer-
red by the constitutional provision. And it was because of
the authority of the State to determine what should consti-
tute its legislative process that the validity of the require-
ment of the State Constitution of Ohio, in its application to
congressional elections, was sustained.
As each state has the power of defining its lawmaking power
it follows that it may make the action of the legislature in con-
gressional redistricting subject to the veto power of the gov-
ernor.
The Court also followed the Missouri and New York courts in
holding that the Apportionment Act of 1911 had not been whol-
ly replaced by the Apportionment Act of 1929. Sections 1 and
2 of the former Act, making specific provisions for the appor-
tionment under the thirteenth census, are, of course, superseded.
This is not true of the remaining sections unless they are incon-
sistent with the Act of 1929. As section 4 of the Act of 1911 is
not inconsistent with the Act of 1929 the two additional repre-
sentatives in New York may be elected at large as provided by
that section. In Minnesota and Missouri, where the number of
representatives has been decreased "unless and until new dis-
tricts are created, all Representatives . . . must be elect-
ed . . . at large. That would be required, in the absence of
a redistricting act, in order to afford the representation to which
the State is constitutionally entitled, and the general provisions
of the Act of 1911 can not be regarded as intended to have a dif-
ferent import."
32 N. 16 above.
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